Monday, June 27, 2005
Legislating better e-Voting
Politicians are hoping to be able to claim the fame for improving today's inadequate voting systems.
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0,10801,102667,00.html
Unfortunately they do not have the best technical understanding of the real process issues that underpin digital-based voting.
Being able to implement a trusted voting process requires more than just a verified paper ballot audit. If the DRE is manipulating and controlling the whole process it can cheat extensively and taint the paper record at the same time. An example would be not showing all the proper candidates and options to all voters equally, and thus they would believe their paper ballot was correct, when it is in fact compromised.
Similarly, just because the process includes paper artifacts, does not exclude blind or partially sighted voters. Exactly the opposite can be the case, where audio prompting can direct the voting, and then bar-code style printing on the ballot can be touched and sensed and validated.
The Clinton/Boxer legislation is again well-intentioned, but places undue faith in paper trails implemented by vendors without the proper oversight and certification methods to ensure correct operational and process factors are included:
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/legislation/story/0,10801,100073,00.html?from=story_picks
Overall however, the addition of paper ballot records to voting system will improve them, but not as much as advocates hope for.
To achieve a more comprehensive result requires implementation of a robust process model along with a broad range of safeguards and checks built around the voting process itself, such as the TLV approach provides for.
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0,10801,102667,00.html
Unfortunately they do not have the best technical understanding of the real process issues that underpin digital-based voting.
Being able to implement a trusted voting process requires more than just a verified paper ballot audit. If the DRE is manipulating and controlling the whole process it can cheat extensively and taint the paper record at the same time. An example would be not showing all the proper candidates and options to all voters equally, and thus they would believe their paper ballot was correct, when it is in fact compromised.
Similarly, just because the process includes paper artifacts, does not exclude blind or partially sighted voters. Exactly the opposite can be the case, where audio prompting can direct the voting, and then bar-code style printing on the ballot can be touched and sensed and validated.
The Clinton/Boxer legislation is again well-intentioned, but places undue faith in paper trails implemented by vendors without the proper oversight and certification methods to ensure correct operational and process factors are included:
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/legislation/story/0,10801,100073,00.html?from=story_picks
Overall however, the addition of paper ballot records to voting system will improve them, but not as much as advocates hope for.
To achieve a more comprehensive result requires implementation of a robust process model along with a broad range of safeguards and checks built around the voting process itself, such as the TLV approach provides for.
# posted by DRRW @ 11:01 PM 
